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Abstract
It is argued that there is no evidence for causality as a metaphysical re-
lation in quantum phenomena. The assumptions that there are no causal
laws, but only probabilities for physical processes constrained by symme-
tries, leads naturally to quantum mechanics. In particular, an argument
is made for why there are probability amplitudes that are complex num-
bers, which obey the Born rule for quantum probabilities. This argument
generalizes the Feynman path integral formulation of quantum mechanics
to include all possible terms in the action that are allowed by the sym-
metries, but only the lowest order terms are observable at the presently
accessible energy scales, which is consistent with observation. The no-
tion of relational reality is introduced in order to give physical meaning to
probabilities. This appears to give rise to a new interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
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1 Introduction
The world-view that the universe is governed by precise causal or dynamical
laws, which was called the paradigm of laws [1], was due to Galileo, Descartes,
Newton and others. It was argued, however, that the fundamental laws of
physics are effective laws arising from symmetries [1]. This view has the advan-
tage of naturally giving rise to the indeterminism of quantum phenomena. In
the present paper, specific arguments towards obtaining quantum theory in the
absence of causal laws using symmetries will be presented.
In section 2, the notion of causal laws will be critically examined in the
context of wave-particle duality of quantum phenomena, from a historical point
of view. A heuristic principle that eliminates metaphysical relations in physics
that are not invariant under symmetries is formulated in section 3. This prin-
ciple implies that causality as a metaphysical relation should be eliminated in
a theory that has time-reversal symmetry. Then, in section 4, the EPR corre-
lation, indeterminism of the outcomes of measurement, and the accepted view
that there is no causal relation between space-like separated events are used
to argue that there is also no metaphysical causal relation between time-like
separated events. However, physical causality that is the ability to communi-
cate information probabilistically distinguishes these two pairs of events. This
distinction is made in section 5, and an argument, due to Weinberg, that the
non-causality between space-like separated events is due to the Lorentz boost
symmetries is presented. This reinforces the present view on the fundamental
role of symmetries.
In sections 6 and 7, the physical causality is explained on the basis of two
postulates, namely that there are no causal laws but that the probabilities of
physical processes are invariant under a group of symmetries. The first postulate
naturally leads, on using an algebraic theorem due to Horwitz and Albert, to
probability amplitudes as complex numbers. The Born rule is then derived, in
section 7, by considering a ‘which way’ experiment in which interference between
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probability amplitudes is lost. The second postulate then yields a generalization
of Feynman path integral formulation in which the action includes all terms that
are invariant under the symmetries; but only the lowest order terms that are in
the standard model are observed in the experiments performed with presently
accessible energy scales. The question of when a probability amplitude should
be converted to probability, which is called a quantum ‘measurement’, is con-
sidered in section 8. The notion of relational reality that is jointly realized when
two systems interact is introduced. This enables the predictions of probabilis-
tic outcomes during ‘measurements,’ while preserving the universal validity of
quantum mechanics. Also, this makes quantum mechanics both local and real-
istic; but the realism is relational instead of absolute, which enables the present
view to be consistent with Bell’s theorem. The present interpretation is shown
to be intermediate between the Copenhagen and Everett interpretations, and
some speculations are made, in the final section.
2 Causal Laws and Wave-Particle Duality
The first indications that the paradigm of laws may not be valid already ap-
peared during Newton’s study of light. Newton had formulated a highly success-
ful set of laws for material particles, known today as Newton’s laws of motion
and gravitation. Contrary to Newton’s famous statement, “hypotheses non
fingo”, the assumption that the material particles should obey these laws, or
any laws, was a hypothesis. It was natural for Newton to then try to bring
the behavior of light into this paradigm, which he has helped to create more
than anyone else up to that time. So, he made the hypothesis that light con-
sisted of material particles, called corpuscles. This was convenient for Newton
because then these corpuscles are subject to the same laws of motion which he
has already ‘perfected’.
However, Newton’s theory of light ran into problems almost immediately. It
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could not explain partial reflection, as Newton himself recognized. Why is that
when a corpuscle encountered a slab of glass, it was sometimes transmitted and
sometimes reflected? To explain this using the deterministic laws of motion of
Newton, it was supposed at first that there are ‘holes’ and ‘spots’ in the glass, so
that if the corpuscle encountered a hole it went through and if it struck a spot
it was reflected. This was perhaps the first of the patchwork theories of physics
that were proposed in order for physicists to remain within the paradigm of
laws, which will be done all the way to the 21st century. But Newton himself
realized that this theory does not work. This was because, as Feynman [2] has
mentioned, Newton made his own lenses and mirrors by polishing glass. And
he knew that the small scratches that he made with powder as he polished glass
had no appreciable effect on the partial reflection of light.
Newton’s hypotheses, in addition to not explaining partial reflection, could
not explain also interference and diffraction, as is well known. Physicists tried
to solve these problems by abandoning Newton’s ontology of corpuscles, while
keeping his basic assumption that light obeyed deterministic laws. They should
have done the reverse! But I shall follow the historical route before discussing
the logical alternative. Historically, physicists replaced Newton’s corpuscles with
a wave. What made this appealing to them was that Huygens had formulated a
law for the propagation of a wave, called Huygens’ principle, according to which
every point on a wave front acted as a source of secondary wavelets whose
interference was sufficient to reconstruct the subsequent wavefronts. This was
the first dynamical or causal law to govern the propagation of a wave, as opposed
to Newton’s laws that governed the propagation of material particles. And using
these laws and the new ontology that light is a wave it was easy to explain all
phenomena of light known at that time, including partial reflection, interference
and diffraction.
But today we know additional phenomena that would make Newton’s on-
tology of light consisting of corpuscles appear to be fundamentally valid. For
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example, if we make the intensity of light falling on a photographic plate low
enough we see spots appearing, which is interpreted as due to the corpuscles
of light, or photons as they are now called, interacting with the plate. New-
ton could have saved his ontology for light by giving up his hypothesis that
the corpuscles should obey causal deterministic laws. Suppose in the above ex-
ample of the glass slab, 30% of the light is reflected and 70% is transmitted.
Newton could have postulated that a corpuscle has a 30% probability of being
reflected and detected in a detector and 70% probability of it being transmitted
and detected in a different detector. But physicists were unwilling to give up
causal deterministic laws until the twentieth century when observed physical
phenomena made them question their cherished beliefs.
The wave theory received a tremendous boost in the nineteenth century with
the introduction of electric and magnetic fields by Faraday and Maxwell. These
fields obeyed causal deterministic laws that were mathematically formulated
by Maxwell. Moreover, light waves were recognized as special cases of this
electromagnetic field, and Maxwell’s laws justified Huygens’ principle. The price
paid now for staying within the paradigm of laws was only that the universe had
to be regarded as a strange mixture of material particles and fields. Physicists
lived with this dual ontology even when an inconsistency was found between the
two sets of laws that governed material particles and fields. This inconsistency,
first clearly recognized by Einstein, was that the symmetries of the laws of
mechanics that governed material particles were not the same as the symmetries
of the laws of the electromagnetic field. Einstein required that both symmetries
should be the same, and asserted the primacy of fields over particles by requiring
that the laws of mechanics should be modified so that they have the same
Lorentz group of symmetries as the laws of the electromagnetic field. This was
the first time in the history of physics that symmetries took priority over laws in
the sense that the laws were modified to conform to the symmetries. Moreover,
the existence of universal symmetries for all the laws of physics enabled the
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construction of a physical geometry having the same symmetries, namely the
Minkowski space-time.
3 Role of Symmetries in Eliminating Meta-
physical Relations
The Lorentz group of symmetries also eliminated the following three metaphys-
ical relations that existed prior to Einstein’s paper on relativity. 1) Newton’s
postulated “absolute space” (on the basis of his rotating bucket argument), or
the “ether” in which light waves propagated, implied an absolute relation be-
tween two time- like separated events that have the same absolute position in
this “absolute space”. 2) Newtonian physics assumed that two events have the
relation of absolute simultaneity if they occur at the same “absolute time”. 3)
Newtonian physics allowed for causal relations to exist between absolutely si-
multaneous events. For Newton’s gravitational interaction, these were the only
causal relations. But since these three relations are not Lorentz invariant (rela-
tion (1) is not even Galilei invariant), and therefore not an objective property
of the world, they were discarded. The overthrow of (3), which Newton himself
regarded as unnatural, meant that, since any pair of space-like events is simul-
taneous in an appropriately chosen inertial frame, and all inertial frames are
related by the Lorentz group of symmetries, the resulting acausality needed to
be extended to all space-like separated events.
In order to eliminate such metaphysical relations in general, I now formu-
late a heuristic principle, called M : A necessary and sufficient condition for a
relation to be admissible as an ontological relation in a physical theory is that
it should be invariant under all the symmetries of the theory. Here the term
‘relation’ is understood in the usual sense of this term between two physical
concepts or objects, in general. The above three relations, specifically, are be-
tween events in space- time S. Any relation in S is defined mathematically as
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a subset of S × S. On the basis of M , the metaphysical relation (1) of abso-
lute position, and hence absolute space, was not admissible even in Newtonian
physics because this relation is not invariant under the Galilei boosts that are
symmetries of this theory. But the other two metaphysical relations mentioned
above were invariant under the Galilei group of symmetries and therefore ex-
cluded only because the Galilei group was superseded by the Lorentz group of
symmetries as a result of the work of Lorentz, Poincare and Einstein.
However, there still remained the following metaphysical relation: 4) The
causal relation between two events that are time- like separated. But this re-
lation is asymmetric in time because while an earlier event a may influence a
later event b, it is not possible for the later event to influence the earlier event.
Even in a deterministic theory like classical electrodynamics, time asymmetric
causality is introduced by the choice of retarded Green’s functions. This is un-
like Newton’s causal relation between simultaneous events, which is a symmetric
relation because of Newton’s third law of motion, and invariant under the Galilei
group of symmetries. The physical theories we have today are invariant under
time reversal symmetry T, apart from weak interaction which is irrelevant to
the problem at hand because causality is posited today even in the absence
of weak interaction. Moreover, all theories of physics today, including weak
interactions, have CPT symmetry. Hence, the principle M , and time reversal
symmetry in the absence of weak interactions or CPT symmetry in the presence
of weak interactions imply that the metaphysical relation (4) of causality should
be discarded. Alternatively, if causality is to be kept then CPT symmetry or T
symmetry in the absence of weak interactions should be discarded. But while
people would agree that the later event b cannot influence the earlier event a,
they would not accept the reverse even though the intervening space-time region
between a and b has the same structure for both relations!
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4 Indeterminism and the EPR Paradox
Eliminating causality means that a given event is not uniquely determined by
the ‘earlier’ events. Then there must be indeterminism in our physical theory.
But historically, physicists seriously entertained indeterminism only after the
wave-particle duality was forced upon them. The work of Planck and Einstein
showed that it was necessary to associate particles with the electromagnetic field,
vindicating the ontology of Newton. But at the same time, the field included
the wave aspect. This wave-particle duality was recognized as characteristic of
all particles by De Broglie, and Schro¨dinger introduced the wave function that
obeyed Schro¨dinger’s equation to represent the wave properties. The relation
between the wave and the particle was given in probabilistic terms by Born: The
probability density of observing a particle at x is |ψ(x)|2, where ψ is the wave
function of the particle representing its state. More generally, the probability
of observing this particle in a state φ is | < ψ|φ > |2. Originally, this Born rule
was associated with an assumed indeterministic change from the state ψ to φ.
Subsequently, two different deterministic descriptions of quantum phenomena
were given by Bohm [5] (also called the causal interpretation of quantum me-
chanics) and Everett [6]. But for these descriptions to be empirically relevant,
they need to give the experimentally well confirmed Born rule. In the latter
two descriptions, however, probabilities are introduced ad hoc, which amount
to bringing the indeterminism of quantum mechanics through the back door.
I shall now show that, owing to this indeterminism, the correlation between
two entangled states, between which there is no causal relation, is metaphysically
similar to the correlation between two states that are related by Schro¨dinger
evolution. Consider two spin-half particles 1 and 2, which interacted some time
ago but no longer interacting, and whose spin states are now EPR correlated:
ψ =
1√
2
(ψ↑(1)ψ↓(2)− ψ↓(1)ψ↑(2)) (1)
where ψ↑(1) is the spin-up state of particle 1 and ψ↓(2) is the spin-down state
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of particle 2 etc. The state (1) is spherically symmetric because its total spin is
zero; therefore the ‘spin-up’ and ‘spin-down’ basis states may be with respect to
any direction in space. As is also well known, it is not possible to communicate
using the entanglement between the two particles in (1) because they are non
interacting. Suppose Alice and Bob make measurements on particles 1 and 2,
respectively, and try to use their outcomes to communicate. If Alice observes
1 to have spin- up (spin-down) along the z−direction, she can predict with
certainty that 2 has spin-down (spin-up). Therefore, Bob by measuring the
spin along the z−direction for 2 can verify the outcome of Alice’s measurement,
provided Alice has informed Bob beforehand that she will measure spin in the
z−direction. But it is impossible for Alice to send a signal this way because
of the indeterminacy of the outcome of her own measurement. Suppose now
that Alice and Bob have decided beforehand that if Alice measures spin along
the z−direction (x−direction) the signal she sends to Bob is ‘yes’ (‘no’). But
it is impossible for Bob to know which observable Alice has actually measured
because of the indeterminacy of the outcome of his own measurement. Thus the
indeterminacy of quantum mechanics prevents Alice communicating with Bob
using the entanglement in (1).
The inability to communicate signals faster than the speed of light c, and the
ability to communicate signals with speed less or equal to c is called Einstein
causality. We saw above that since quantum mechanics allows for entanglement,
the indeterminism in the outcome of measurements is essential to preserve Ein-
stein causality. People often wonder why non relativistic quantum mechanics
should preserve Einstein causality, which was obtained from relativistic physics.
However, the above argument that Alice cannot communicate with Bob through
entanglement without interaction applies to any two degrees of freedom that
are entangled. Alice’s and Bob’s measurements need not be space-like sepa-
rated events; Bob could make his measurement to the future of Alice. And the
two entangled degrees of freedom need not be separated in space like the two
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particles above; they could be right on top of each other. To prove this, it is
sufficient to note that the evolution of the reduced density matrix ρ2 of parti-
cle 2 is governed entirely by the Hamiltonian of particle 2 because there is no
interaction between particles 1 and 2. Therefore, whatever measurement Alice
makes on particle 1 would affect ρ1 but not ρ2. Hence, the outcomes of Bob’s
measurements on particle 2 that are determined by ρ2 are unaffected by Alice’s
measurements.
Thus Alice’s inability to send a signal from event a to event b by means of
entanglement between two non- interacting systems is independent of whether
a and b are space-like, time-like or null separated. However, Alice may send a
signal using the time-evolution of the wave function when a and b are time-like
or null separated. For example, Alice and Bob may agree beforehand to measure
a particular component of spin, say Sz, and that if Alice sends a spin-up (spin-
down) particle to Bob then Alice means yes (no). Suppose Alice wishes to send
the signal ‘yes’. She then measures a spin component on the wave function
ψ of a spin-half particle at time 0 in the neighborhood of a. If the outcome is
spin-up she does nothing, but if the outcome is spin-down she rotates it to make
it spin-up or she keeps measuring other spin-half particles until she gets one in
the spin-up state. Then she sends ψ(0) = ψ↑ to Bob. During the subsequent
time evolution, there is rotational symmetry. Therefore, due to conservation of
angular momentum, at time t, ψ(t) will have spin up. Bob then measures Sz in
the neighborhood of b that is in the future of a. He finds it be in the state ψ↑
with 100% proabability, and feels elated because Alice has said ‘yes’.
However, if Alice had not communicated to Bob beforehand which spin-
component she will measure, Bob cannot determine the signal she had sent.
This is because the outcome of Bob’s measurement of the spin-component in a
general direction is indeterminate. Alice then would have to send a large number
of particles in the state ψ(0) at time t = 0 to Bob so that Bob may statistically
determine by means of his own measurements the signal that she sent. Even this
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would not be possible if Alice is not allowed to get around the indeterminacy
of her measurements and put her particle(s) in the state ψ(0) = ψ↑ as in the
first case of trying to communicate via entanglement mentioned above. Hence
the metaphysical connection, due to entanglement, between ψ↑ and ψ↓ is similar
to the metaphysical connection, due to Schro¨dinger evolution, between ψ(0) and
ψ(t), because of the indeterminacy in the outcomes of measurements of Alice
and Bob. But, as seen above, there is nevertheless an important distinction
between the two connections or correlations, which is called physical causality
in the next section.
5 Physical and Metaphysical Causalities
It is necessary to distinguish between two types of “causality” at this point.
By metaphysical or deterministic causality will be meant the relation between
occurrences α and β that exists if the occurrence α always produces, determines
or necessitates the occurrence β. But the ability to communicate information,
albeit probabilistically, is here called physical causality. More precisely, physical
or probabilistic causality is the relation between the occurrence α and occur-
rences β1, β2, β3, .... that holds if given the occurrence of α we can predict the
probabilities of β1, β2, β3, ..... In the examples in section 4, if Alice and Bob do
not measure the same component of spin, say by prior agreement, then Alice’s
measurement, call it α, does not necessitate the result β of Bob’s measurement,
whether or not these two measurements are separated by a space-like, time-like
or null intervals. So, there is no metaphysical causality in all these cases. How-
ever, Alice can influence the probability of the outcome of Bob’s measurements
if Bob makes his measurements to the future of Alice, as in the example in the
previous section in which she sends him polarized particles, but not when the
two sets of measurements are space-like separated. This is an example of phys-
ical causality. In this section it will be argued that symmetries are responsible
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for some common statements involving physical causality.
One such statement is Einstein causality according to which there can be
physical causality between time-like or null separated events but not between
space-like separated events. As mentioned above, this is realized only proba-
bilistically in quantum phenomena. But Einstein himself was deeply attached
to metaphysical causality, as shown from his following statement [7]:
“... I should not want to be forced into abandoning strict causality without de-
fending it more strongly than I have so far. I find the idea quite intolerable that an
electron exposed to radiation should choose of its own free will, not only its moment
to jump off, but also its direction. In that case I would rather be a cobbler, or even
an employee in a gaming-house, than a physicist.”
It is ironical that Einstein who overthrew three of the four metaphysical relations
mentioned in section 3, could never give up the fourth metaphysical relation of
causality.
The only way to experimentally test physical causality is by means of a large
number of trials of the form (α, β1), (α, β2), (α, β3), ..... The relative frequency
of each distinct pair in this experiment, as the number of trials tend to infinity, is
the probability of occurrence of this pair. However, in a given trial, say (α, β3),
we may ask, as Einstein does implicitly in the above statement, why is it that
α was followed by β3 and not β1, β2 or β4, ..? This absence of metaphysical
causality, due to the indeterminism in quantum phenomena, should make us re-
examine the meaning and validity of physical causality as well. Suppose Alice
sends a large number of spin-half particles in state α, say the spin-up state, to
Bob. By doing experiments of the above form with a large number of trials,
Bob determines to a very high probability the state α. This is possible in this
instance because of conservation of angular momentum that ensures that all the
particles are in the same spin state when they reach Bob. But this conservation
of angular momentum is due to rotational symmetry.
In general, conservation laws are due to symmetries. And if the state is not
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an eigenstate of the conserved quantity then the conservation is realized only
statistically, i.e. the expectation value of the conserved quantity is preserved in
time. The equality of the expectation values of the conserved quantity at two
different times is therefore like physical causality, because of the probabilistic
manner in which they are both determined, and does not imply metaphysical
causality. But the symmetries are not probabilistic as far as we know. This
suggests that symmetries may be more basic than dynamical laws that may
actually be effective laws arising from symmetries.
It is often stated that Einstein causality is incorporated in quantum field
theory by the requirement that field operators at events that are space-like
separated are independent in the sense that they must commute if they are
Bosonic fields and anti-commute if they are Fermionic fields. I.e. if φm(x)
are the components of the various fields in the theory, where x stands for the
space-time coordinate (x, t), then
[φm(x), φn(y)]± = 0 (2)
whenever x and y are space-like separated. The ± in (2) refers to anti-
commutator if the fields are Fermionic and commutator if the fields are Bosonic.
However, (2) does not require Einstein causality and may be introduced in
order that a local quantum field theory is Lorentz invariant [8]. To see this,
consider the time evolution operator U for quantum states in the interaction
picture of a canonically quantized field theory that is generated by the interac-
tion Hamiltonian HI(t). Since HI(t) represents the interaction energy, and the
locality assumption requires that this energy is the sum of energies in all the
different regions of space,
HI(t) =
∫
d3xH(x),
where H(x) is the interaction Hamiltonian density. It follows that
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U = T exp(− i
h¯
∫
HI(t)dt) = 1+
∞∑
n=1
1
n!
(− i
h¯
)n
∫
d4x1d
4x2....d
4xn T {H(x1)H(x2)....H(xn)}
where T denotes the time ordering operation meaning that it orders the op-
erators from left to right in the monotonically decreasing order of the values
of their argument t. This ordering is independent of the chosen Lorentz frame
if every pair H(xr),H(xs) commute whenever xr, xs are space-like separated.
This is guaranteed by the independence of fields at space-like separated events
given by (2). Thus ‘Einstein causality’ in a local quantum field theory may be
regarded as due to the Lorentz group of symmetries. This is analogous to how
the same symmetries discarded the metaphysical relations (2) and (3) of New-
tonian absolute simultaneity and causality between simultaneous events during
the creation of special relativity, as mentioned in section 3.
6 Objective Probabilities and Probability Am-
plitudes
The metaphysical causality, mentioned above, was associated with the meta-
physical necessity of causal dynamical laws [1]. Therefore, since this metaphysi-
cal causality was discarded above, it is no longer necessary to assume the meta-
physical necessity that is responsible for causal laws. An advantage of discarding
metaphysical causality is that the indeterminism of quantum phenomena may
then be deduced, instead of postulating it a priori. This solves the statistical
aspect of the measurement problem, mentioned in Einstein’s statement quoted
in section 5. The only causality which now remains is the physical causality that
is determined by the operator U , and which is realized only probabilistically.
The above arguments suggest, however, that symmetries are more funda-
mental than physical causality. I shall therefore, from now on, assume A) there
are no causal dynamical laws. This implies that physical processes cannot be
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deterministic, because there is nothing compelling a physical system to evolve
in a definite manner. It follows that we can only assign probabilities for phys-
ical processes, which is consistent with the experimentally observed intrinsic
indeterminism of quantum phenomena, as mentioned above. I shall assume also
that B) the probabilities of physical processes are invariant under a group of
symmetries.
According to classical physics, a particle goes from an event a to an event
b along a definite path that is determined by the laws of classical physics. If
we discard causal dynamical laws, in accordance with assumption (A), then the
particle need not take a definite path and all paths between a and b are equally
probable. If we give up only determinism which is associated with metaphysical
causality, then it is possible for the probabilities for the paths to be different,
e.g. the classical path may have probability greater than all the other paths.
But this would be a causal law that is probabilistic. I am taking assumption
(A), however, to imply a maximal violation of the classical causal dynamical
law, which is why all paths are given equal probability. Physically, this means
that if we observe precisely whether the particle takes an arbitrary path between
a and b then it would take this path with 100% probability; this makes all paths
between a and b have the same probability[15]. This condition will be discussed
more later. More generally, the paths may be in the configuration space of
a more complicated physical system. The preference for configuration space
instead of, say, the momentum space of the system is because the observation
of the path by an apparatus needs to be realized by an interaction between the
apparatus and the system, and all interactions are local at presently accessible
energy scales. In order for such an observation to be like any other physical
process, reality needs to be defined relationally as the outcome of interactions,
which will be done in section 8. For simplicity and ease of visualization, I shall
continue to treat the possible paths of the system as space-time paths of a
particle.
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If we suppose naively that the probability of the particle to go from a to
b, denoted P (b, a), is the sum of the probabilities of the possible individual
paths then, since there are an infinite number of equally probable paths, the
probability of each path is zero. We may try to mathematically implement this
equal probability rule by defining on this set of paths a measure and a probability
density that is positive and constant. Then if the volume of this set of paths
with respect to this measure is infinite, the integral of this probability density
would also be infinite and cannot equal P (b, a) ≤ 1. Restricting the volume
of the infinite dimensional manifold of paths to be finite would be artificial
and would amount to introducing a law. Therefore, there must be cancellation
between different paths in order to obtain a sensible result for P (b, a). This
may be achieved by introducing the probability amplitude for each path such
that the set A of probability amplitudes is a group under the operation of
addition. If we require that the probability amplitudes should first be added
before forming the probability from this sum, then adding these amplitudes
would give the required cancellation. Also, the probability of a system going
from a to c through b should be the product of its probabilities to go from a to
b and b to c. This suggests that it should be possible to multiply probability
amplitudes. Then A should form an algebra. To obtain a probability that is
a non-negative number from the probability amplitude, one may introduce a
norm, denoted by ||, on A. The above mentioned multiplicative property of
probabilities suggests that |ψφ| = |ψ||φ|, for probability amplitudes ψ and φ. A
theorem by Hurwitz [13], generalized by Albert [14], states that A should then
be the reals, complex numbers, quaternions or octonions [16].
Octonions may be excluded as candidates for probability amplitudes due to
the non associativity under multiplication, if addition is also taken into account.
Consider the case of an electron that can either go through two screens with
a single slit in each or go around both screens to reach the point where it is
detected. If we use octonions as probability amplitudes, then the probability of
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detection is determined by the norm |(ψ1ψ2)ψ3+φ| or |ψ1(ψ2ψ3)+φ| where the
octonions (ψ1ψ2)ψ3 or ψ1(ψ2ψ3) are the amplitudes to go through the two slits
and the octonian φ is the amplitude to go around the two slits. But the above
two norms are unequal in general. For a fixed set of amplitudes, one could try
to remove this ambiguity by choosing a particular order of multiplication, e.g.
((ψ1ψ2)ψ3)... which violates time reversal symmetry. Also, if we divide a path
into segments, then it is not possible to see how one could define a product
of amplitudes associated with the segments that would be independent of the
choice of this division.
For the probabilities of different paths between a pair of events to be equal,
in accordance with assumption (A), it is reasonable for the norms of the cor-
responding probability amplitudes to be equal. If A is taken to be the field of
real numbers then these amplitudes can only differ in sign, and the sum of these
infinite number of amplitudes would not give a sensible result. It is perfectly
possible a priori to have a physical theory that uses only real numbers, e.g.
classical physics. But such a theory would not satisfy assumption (A), above, if
we allow for infinite number of ways in which a system may go from a configura-
tion a to a configuration b with equal probabilities. The probability amplitude
should therefore be taken to be a complex number or quaternion. Adler [16] has
found it not possible to construct a path integral using quaternions. We there-
fore take A to be the field of complex numbers, because the present approach
leads naturally to a path integral, as will be seen explicitly in the next section.
7 Origin of the Born Rule and Quantum Dy-
namics
The question arises as to how the probability P (b, a) may be obtained from
the sum of probability amplitudes, denoted K(b, a). To answer this, consider
the double slit experiment and, for simplicity, suppose that there are just two
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paths, γ1 and γ2 for a particle to go from an event a at the source to an event
b at the screen through slit 1 and slit 2, respectively. Then K(b, a) = ψ1 + ψ2
where ψ1 and ψ2 are the complex probability amplitudes for the paths γ1 and
γ2, respectively. Let P˜ (ψ) denote the probability of the probability amplitude
ψ.
Now if we observe through which slit the particle went through then the
probability is the sum of the probabilities of going through either slit. This
is a consequence of the relational reality which will be introduced in the next
section according to which the interaction of the particle with another system
determines the state of each of them relative to the other. Interaction, by
definition, changes the phase of the probability amplitude. Since a device that
interacts with the particle to determine whether it took path γ1 is also quantum
mechanical, the phase of ψ1 is uncertain
1. I shall suppose that this interaction is
such that the phase of ψ1 is completely uncertain. Averaging over this uncertain
phase should give the sum of the probabilities for the two paths:
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dθ1 P˜ (ψ1 + ψ2) = P˜ (ψ1) + P˜ (ψ2) (3)
where P˜ (ψ1) and P˜ (ψ2) are the probabilities for the paths γ1 and γ2, and
θ1 = argψ1, θ2 = argψ2. This averaging may be physically visualized by means
of an ensemble of particles that pass through the double slit and strike the
screen as follows. The particles acquire all possible relative phases for ψ1 and ψ2
with equal probabilities. Each relative phase gives a corresponding probability
distribution for detecting the particle on the screen. Then (3) is the average of
this probability distributions.
1The usual description of decoherence regards it as occurring due to the entanglement
of the system with states of the environment that are orthogonal due to the influence of
the system. But it has been shown that [17], equivalently, decoherence may be regarded as
due to an uncertain phase difference θ between interfering probability amplitudes due to the
influence of the quantum environment. Specifically, if the average < eiθ >= 0, then there is
decoherence.
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Since θ1 in the left hand side of (3) is integrated over, P˜ (ψ1) in the right
hand side is independent of θ1. Hence, P˜ (ψ) is a function of |ψ| only. Since P˜ (ψ)
is a non-negative function, it is reasonable to suppose that P˜ (ψ) = |ψ|n, where
n is a non-negative integer. Suppose also that P˜ (ψ1) = P˜ (ψ2), which is the case
if γ1 and γ2 are the only paths available to the particle. Then, |ψ1| = |ψ2| = a,
say, so that |ψ1 + ψ2| = 2a| cos(θ/2)|, where θ = θ1 − θ2. Therefore, (3) reads
2n
2pi
∫ pi
0
dθ| cosn θ| = 1. (4)
Now for any non-negative integer m,
∫ pi
0
dθ| cos2m+1 θ| = 2
∫ pi/2
0
dθ cos2m+1 θ =
22m+1(m!)2
(2m+ 1)!
Since this is a rational number, (4) cannot be satisfied by odd n. Therefore,
n = 2m. Now, ∫ pi
0
dθ cos2m θ =
(2m)!
22m(m!)2
pi
Hence, (4) reads
(2m)!
2(m!)2
= 1 (5)
This is satisfied for m = 1. But for m > 1, it is easily shown that (2m)!2(m!)2 > 1
and therefore (5) is not satisfied. Also, for n = 0 clearly (4) is not satisfied.
Hence, (3) is satisfied with P˜ (ψ) = |ψ|n if and only if n = 2, i.e.
P˜ (ψ) = |ψ|2 (6)
Hence, P (b, a) = |K(b, a)|2, which gives the Born rule. This of course is in agree-
ment with the observed interference pattern that results if we do not observe
which slit the particle went through.
Since all paths are equally probable, in accordance with assumption (A), it
follows that the probability amplitude assigned to an arbitrary path γ joining
a and b should be N exp[iS(γ)], where N is independent of γ and S is real.
Hence,
K(b, a) =
∑
γ
N exp[iS(γ)], (7)
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Assumption (B) then implies that the probability |K(b, a)|2 is invariant under
the symmetry group. A sufficient condition for this is that S is invariant under
the symmetry group. The highly successful Feynman path integral formulation
of quantum mechanics assumes (7) with S(γ) = Sγ/h¯, where Sγ is the classical
action for the path γ. Under this assumption it is easy to understand why the
classical limit corresponds to the particle taking the trajectory for which S is
an extremum: In the classical limit Sγ >> h¯ for all possible trajectories, but
the amplitudes for trajectories far away from the classical or extremal trajectory
cancel out each other, while those in the neighborhood of the extremal trajectory
add constructively.
As mentioned earlier, quantum mechanics maximally violates the laws of
classical physics because the classical laws constrain the particle to move along
the classical trajectory for which the classical action is an extremum, whereas
quantum mechanics gives equal probability to all possible trajectories. But if
the action in (7) is confined to be the classical action, as in ordinary quantum
mechanics, then this would constitute a law, albeit probabilistic. Therefore, in
accordance with the principles (A) and (B) above, I require a maximal violation
of the laws of quantum mechanics as formulated by Feynman by postulating
the following hypothesis: Sγ contains all terms that are invariant under the
symmetries. For this hypothesis to be in agreement with observation, it is of
course necessary that the resulting quantum theory should be approximately in
agreement with quantum mechanics that uses only the classical action for all
the experiments that we have performed so far.
In order to do this, we need to replace Sγ by an action S made from all
the fields which are obtained from representations of the symmetry group. The
development of effective field theories [18] have enabled the inclusion into S
all the terms that are allowed by the symmetries that can be formed from the
fields in the standard model. Only the lowest order terms are conventionally
renormalizable, in the sense that they require a finite number of counter terms
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to cancel the ultraviolet divergences, which may thus be included into a finite
number of coupling constants. This makes the standard model unique apart
from the values of the coupling constants which need to be determined by ex-
periments. While the somewhat unique determination of the standard model by
the requirement of invariance under symmetries and renormalizability may be
an indication of the fundamental role played by the symmetries, the principles
(A) and (B) would require that we include in S all the terms that are allowed by
symmetries. It turns out that including every term that is consistent with the
symmetries in S, as shown by Weinberg [8], provides counter terms to cancel
all the ultraviolet divergences in the Feynman diagrams. It is the lowest order
terms that we directly observe at presently accessible energies, which gives the
illusion that the action contains only a finite number of terms, as assumed in the
paradigm of laws. If we go to high enough energies, we should be able to see the
other terms, and measure the associated coupling constants, according to this
hypothesis. The standard model, which was originally formulated with a finite
number of terms in the Lagrangian that are invariant under the symmetries,
defines an effective field theory, which is sufficient to make all the observable
predictions at the energy scales at which we now do experiments, according to
the present view.
Also, from the above path integral, Schro¨dinger’s equation for the fields and
its non relativisitic limit for particles may be obtained in a well known manner.
This may be turned around, and one may start with Schro¨dinger’s formulation
and obtain the path integral. If one asks for the probability for observing the
system taking any path between the initial and final states, the answer turns
out to be unity, and the system then acquires the phase associated with this
path that is predicted by Feynman [15]. This result shows the consistency of
Schro¨dinger’s or the equivalent Heisenberg formulation of quantum mechanics
with the above assumption that all paths have equal probability and the result
that the phases of the probability amplitudes associated with the paths at low
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energies are the Feynman phases.
In the present view, the action is more fundamental than the ‘laws’ derived by
extremizing the action, which has important physical consequences. It implies
that a given field that obeys an effective law cannot be regarded as complete
unless this law can be obtained from an action principle, which may require
introducing other fields. For example, the electromagnetic field strength Fµν
obeys the Maxwell’s equations and the Lorentz force classically. But to obtain
these laws from an action principle, we need to introduce the potential Aµ. And
the action that is a function of Aµ then gives rise to new effects, such as the
Aharonov-Bohm effect [9]. While the Aharonov-Bohm effect may be expressed
non locally in terms of the field strength Fµν , its generalizations to non-Abelian
gauge fields cannot be expressed in terms of only the Yang-Mills field strength
F iµν even non-locally, and requires the potential A
i
µ.
The present approach explains the physical causality discussed in section 5 in
a lawless manner. The probability for any physical process is obtained from (7),
where all possible histories are given equal probability weights. Therefore, when
Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are time-like separated, the determination of
the probabilities of the outcomes of Bob’s measurements by Alice’s measurement
is due to the constraint of the probability amplitudes by the symmetries, and
not because of any causal dynamical law.
8 The Physical Meaning of Probabilities and
the Quantum Measurement Problem
The probability amplitudes were obtained in the previous section on the basis
that there are no causal laws. The ‘probabilities’ that are obtained from the
probability amplitudes are the probabilities of ‘real’ events. This raises the
question of what reality means. So far no objective criterion has been provided
for when the probability amplitudes should be converted to probabilities, which
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is the quantum measurement problem in the present language of probability
amplitudes (as opposed to wave functions) [10].
The notion of reality that has been commonly used is the view that ‘exis-
tence’ is an absolute property or predicate that any conceivable object does or
does not possess. If it has this property or predicate then it is said to exist,
otherwise it is said not to exist, and this is independent of its interactions with
other objects. I shall call this the notion of absolute reality.
But from an operational point of view, absolute reality is meaningless. Con-
sider the statement that there is only one object in the universe. Whether this
object exists or does not exist cannot be operationally distinguished and seems
to be a meaningless question. However, the existence of two objects may be
given meaning through the interaction between them. This leads to the notion
of relational reality or interactive reality, namely that two objects exist in rela-
tion to each other if they interact. According to this view, the state or wave
function in which an object ‘exists’ is meaningless if it is not interacting with
another object. It was mentioned in section 4 that, although entanglement be-
tween two objects represents correlations, it is not possible to communicate by
means of this entanglement unless the objects interact; thus interaction between
two objects is necessary for one object to know the (relative) existence of the
other.
Another motivation for introducing relational reality comes from the crite-
rion of reality formulated sometime ago [11]. According to this if two objects
interact in such a way so as to satisfy the action-reaction principle, then both ob-
jects exist. This criterion was then used as a sufficient condition for establishing
the reality of objects in particular cases. But the relational reality introduced
above is symmetrical with respect to the two objects, and may provide a deep
reason why the action-reaction principle is always satisfied in nature, or this
may conversely be regarded as indication of relational reality. Indeed, I shall
use the action-reaction principle here as a necessary and sufficient condition for
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reality. As a particular application, according to the De Broglie-Bohm hypoth-
esis, the wave guides the particle to move along a particular trajectory, but
the particle itself does not react back on the wave [5]. According to the above
symmetric criterion of reality therefore we cannot regard the particle being in
this trajectory as real.
The above relational reality removes some of the paradoxes associated with
the quantum measurement problem. For example, the Schro¨dinger cat may be
inside a box in the alive state |ψa > relative to the interactions it undergoes
with itself and the box. But an observer outside the box, who so far has not
interacted with the cat, could in principle observe the cat in the state |ψc >=
1√
2
(|ψa > +|ψd >) with probability 1, where |ψd > is the state of the dead
cat, provided there is an interaction between her or her apparatus and the cat
such that |ψc > is an eigenstate of the interaction Hamiltonian HI . There
would be no contradiction between the two states of the cat, namely |ψa > and
|ψc > because these are states that the cat has relative to the interactions it
undergoes with two different systems. But in practice, there is no interaction
for which the cat would have the state |ψc >, because if there were one, then
< ψa|HI |ψd > 6= 0, which is not possible because of the large number of degrees
of freedom of the cat. Therefore, it is not possible to give relational reality to
the superposition |ψc >. Also, the outside observer is interacting with the cat
through the gravitational field and via the box with which they both interact; so
they form a single interactional reality. For example, she could verify in principle
that the cat is alive by interacting with its time dependent gravitational field
outside the box as it moves inside the box, without opening the box. Hence,
when she opens the box, she will see the cat in the alive state. In general, the
relational reality of the cat is that it is alive or dead.
But for microsystems, it is easy to produce examples like the one above. For
example, consider a double slit experiment with electrons. The state of each
electron when it passes the double slilt screen is 1√
2
(|ψ1 > +|ψ2 >) relative to
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the screen because of its interaction with the screen. Suppose that near one
slit a neutron is introduced which is in a spin-up state | ↑>, with respect to
the z−axis of a Cartesian coordinate system, which is verified by a separate
interaction of an apparatus with the neutron. If the neutron does not interact
with the electron, then due to conservation of angular momentum which in
turn is due to rotational symmetry, the neutron may subsequently observed by
means of a suitable interaction to be in the same state with probability 1. The
arrangement is such that whenever the neutron interacts with the electron, it
undergoes a spin flip, i.e. its state is | ↓> relative to the electron, while the
state of electron relative to the neutron is then |ψ1 >. But an external observer
may observe the combined system of the neutron and electron in the state
|ψ >= 1√
2
(|ψ1 > | ↓> +|ψ2 > | ↑>)
with probability 1, relative to an interaction that she or her apparatus has for
which |ψ > is an eigenstate of HI . On the other hand, the neutron and the
electron ‘observe’ each other, whenever they interact, in the state |ψ1 > | ↓>
with probability 1/2. Of course, neither particle can express what they ‘observe,’
unlike human beings. But this statement is not empty because it may be verified
by observing the state of the neutron to be | ↓> in half of an ensemble of such
experiments.
The third example that I shall consider is the protective observation of the
extended wave function of a single particle [12]. The key to the protective
observation is that the combined system of the particle being observed and the
particle that does the probing is in an unentangled state ψφ, where ψ and φ are
the wave functions of the two particles, respectively. This is achieved by having
ψ originally in an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian and making the interaction
between the two particles adiabatic and weak so that ψφ continues to evolve
as an approximate eigenstate of the Hamiltonian, according to the adiabatic
theorem. For example, ψ may be the ground state of a proton inside a box
and φ may be the localized wave packet of an electron slowly moving in the
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box. By sending several such electrons, from the behavior of the corresponding
states φ, it is possible in principle to reconstruct ψ, even though this is the
extended wave function of a single particle. The usual non adiabatic strong
measurements, however, would enable the reconstruction of an extended ψ only
statistically by putting sequentially many protons inside the box in the state
ψ, and observing each of them with electrons. This is because in the usual
measurements there will be an entanglement between the two systems, which
prevents us from saying which state the proton is in. If we try to find this
by means of a subsequent measurement on the electron, the entangled wave
function of the combined system appears to undergo a sudden unpredictable
change, which brings up the measurement problem in the language of wave
functions.
There is now the following paradox: Suppose we observe ψ protectively
(adiabatically) and conclude that it is real or ontological. And then we do the
usual measurement, which leads to the “collapse” of this wave function to a
localized state ψ′. For the new measurement, ψ is only used epistemologically
to predict the probability of the new state ψ′ by means of the Born rule. So,
what happened to the reality of ψ? This paradox is resolved if we give up the
notion of absolute reality, and accept that both ψ and ψ′ are real only in relation
to the interaction that they undergo with the systems they interact with. The
sudden change from ψ to ψ′ is not paradoxical if we do not assign absolute
reality to either wave function, but instead assign relational reality to them,
which requires that such a change should take place because the interaction
that determines this relational reality has changed.
In all three examples, above, in the assigment of relational reality to one
of two interacting systems, the following condition is satisfied, which will be
called R: Two systems interact with each other in such a way that their states
remain unentangled, and the interaction satisfies the action-reaction principle.
This suggests using the condition R as necessary and sufficient criterion for the
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relational reality of states or wave functions, in general. I shall therefore assume
this to be the case, and postulate that the quantum probabilities of the previous
section apply to states that satisfy the condition R.
The influence of each state on the other provides information about the
former via the interaction, when R is satisfied. To illustrate this, consider the
commonly encountered situation in which the Hamiltonian for two systems S1
and S2 is H = H1 +H2+H12. The subscripts 1 and 2 designate operators that
act on the Hilbert spaces of S1 and S2, respectively, and H12 is the interaction
Hamiltonian. Suppose now that H12 = g(t)A1A2, where g(t) is a c-number
coupling constant that represents the turning on and off of the interaction.
In the impulse approximation, g(t) is very large for a short period of time so
that the free Hamiltonian is negligible compared to the interaction Hamiltonian
during this period. Then, if the combined system S1 + S2 was initially in the
unentangled state ψ1ψ2, where ψ1 is an eigenstate of A1 with eigenvalue a,
S1+S2 will continue to be unentangled during the interaction. But the response
of S2 to the interaction, which may be determined by subsequent observations
(interactions), will depend on the eigenvalue a of A1. This is the usual von
Neumann measurement specialized to the case in which S1 was already in an
eigenstate of the observable A1 at the beginning of the interaction. On the
other hand, more generally, if ψ1 were not an eigenstate of A1 then the state
of S1 + S2 that is obtained by solving Schro¨dinger’s equation is an entangled
state ψ12 due to the interaction. According to the present view, ψ12 should
be regarded as the probability amplitude from which the probabilities for the
various states in this superposition that satisfy condition R, such as the above
ψ1ψ2, may be obtained. The only way to give relational reality to ψ12 is to let
it interact with another system with state φ such that ψ12φ satisfies condition
R which makes ψ12 real with respect to φ.
We may now take the opposite limit in which g(t) is small and varies slowly
or adiabatically, so that the interaction Hamiltonian may be regarded as a per-
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turbation of the free Hamiltonian. Also, suppose that ψ1 is a non degenerate
eigenstate of H1 and g(t) does not contain any frequency component that con-
nects ψ1 and the nearest eigenstate. This is the case of protective measurement
[12] in which the combined system remains in the unentangled state; but the
response of ψ2 depends on < ψ1|A1|ψ1 >, which generalizes the eigenvalue of
A1. The third example is the weak measurement of Aharonov (see for example
[19]) in which H12 is so weak that it causes only a small entanglement to the
initial or preselected unentangled state of the two systems. One then makes
a postselection of a particular state ψ1 of system S1. This puts the combined
system in an unentangled state. From the state of system S2, compared to its
initial state, the ‘weak value’ A1w =< ψ1|A1|φ1 > / < ψ1|φ1 > is obtained,
where φ1 is the preselected state of S1. The preselection of φ1 and the postse-
lection of ψ1 mean that each of these states has relational reality with respect
to another system that interacts with it satisfying condition R at the times of
preselection and postselection, respectively. Hence, the information obtained
about these states, φ1 and ψ1, from A1w is consistent with the relational reality
assigned to these states.
In practice, we obtain the information about the state ψ1 through its interac-
tion with ψ2 by choosing S2 to be macroscopic or from a subsequent interaction
of S2 with a macroscopic system. But this is only because we are macroscopic
beings, and it does not imply any necessary asymmetry between the two in-
teracting systems, objectively speaking. The above relational reality condition
R is explicitly symmetric. For example, in the Stern-Gerlach experiment with
neutrons, a given neutron is in the spin-up or spin-down state relative to the
inhomogeneous magnetic field of the magnet, and the magnet relative to the
neutron is then in one of two possible states that have opposite momenta dur-
ing their interaction. This is because each of these unentangled states of the
combined system satisfies R, and the above objective probabilities require that
only one of these possibilities are realized. The magnet may be microscopic or
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macroscopic. If it is microscopic, then it becomes necessary for us to verify the
response of the magnet by means of its interaction with a macroscopic system.
The nonentanglement stipulated in condition R may be satisfied only ap-
proximately in practice. But if one views reality as fluid and not concrete then
this is not a problem. The notion of stark, concrete, absolute reality that we use
in our daily lives, according to which something is or is not, may be useful for
our survival, for example, if we encounter a tiger in a jungle. For this reason, our
brains may have acquired the notion of absolute reality during evolution by nat-
ural selection. This may be due to the stability of certain unentangled states in
our brains due to the nature of the interactions between them. But an objective
examination of the interactions between microsystems suggests that absolute
reality is not valid. The symmetrical relational reality being postulated here,
instead, does not lead to solipsism because each of us is interacting by means
of the gravitational and electromagnetic fields with all the other objects, which
are therefore real to us, and we are to them. But the state in which we observe
another system depends on the nature of our interaction with it.
9 Discussion and Speculation
According to the present view, an arbitrary state of any isolated object repre-
sents only the potentialities for the relational reality that it may have if and
when it interacts with another object. An ‘event’ for which quantum mechanics
assigns a probability of occurrence is the interaction of a pair of states of two
systems that satisfy condition R. Since the interactions are local (due to the
fundamental interactions of gravity and gauge fields being local), the two states
must be localized in order for them to remain unentangled as required by R.
This explains why the world of events that we observe appears to be classical
even though quantum mechanics is universally valid, in the present approach.
It also appears to explain the origin through these events of the space-time
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description, which is different from the Hilbert space description of quantum
mechanics.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics which emerges from the above
analysis is intermediate between the Copenhagen and the Everett interpreta-
tions. It may be reached from the Everett interpretation by replacing the notion
of absolute reality in this interpretation, which makes all the worlds that are
nearly orthogonal because of decoherence to be real, by relational reality that
makes only one of these Everett worlds to have relational reality. The reason
for the latter conclusion is that there is no interaction that connects two Ev-
erett worlds, as in the case of the alive and dead states of the cat mentioned
above, i.e. a superposition of the states of two Everett worlds cannot interact
with another object so that condition R is satisfied. Therefore, a superposi-
tion of two Everett worlds cannot have reality with respect to another object.
Furthermore, the objective probabilities, introduced in sections 6 and 7, give
a probabilistic prediction for the realization of one of these Everett worlds at
each instant of time. On the other hand, the Everett picture is deterministic
and therefore cannot contain objective probabilities; hence probabilities may be
introduced only by coarse-graining, i.e. through ignorance of the precise initial
conditions, as in classical statistical mechanics where also there are no objective
probabilities. It is not clear how the empirically successful Born rule that uses
the geometry of Hilbert space could be obtained from coarse-graining. But in
the present interpretation, these probabilities emerge naturally and objectively
from the denial of fundamental causal laws, and the requirement of invariance
under symmetries, as shown in sections 6 and 7.
The present interpretation may also be reached from the Copenhagen in-
terpretation if in addition to the denial of absolute reality in the latter inter-
pretation, we introduce relational reality. This removes the anthropomorphic
concepts from the Copenhagen interpretation, such as the need for a ‘classical’
measuring apparatus with a human observing it, or introducing ‘measurement’
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by a human or at least a macroscopic system as a special interaction. As Niels
Bohr said, we need to specify the entire experimental arrangement before as-
signing reality to any part of it. But this is necessary only because relational
reality is determined by all the interactions in the entire experimental arrange-
ment. It is not necessary for the specified experimental arrangement to contain
a macroscopic subsystem. The present interpretation therefore abolishes the
notion of ‘measurement’ as a special interaction, and provides an objective, but
relational, description of this process assuming the universal validity of quantum
mechanics.
If absolute reality is replaced by relational reality then it would seem that any
universe that is made of interacting parts and is mathematically consistent may
have relational reality. I shall call the collection of such hypothetical universes
the polyverse. This speculation, because it is based on the notion of reality being
purely relational, provides an answer to the old philosophical question of why
there is something and not nothing. Each universe contained in the polyverse
has no reality as a whole because none is interacting with any other. However,
parts of each universe have relational reality due to their mutual interaction.
Incidentally, this implies that the wave function of the universe as a whole has no
reality, but it is meaningful to assign a wave function to any part of the universe
in relation to another part with which it is interacting. Although none of the
other universes in the polyverse has reality to us, the polyverse nevertheless has
a physical consequence in explaining why the symmetries and coupling constants
of our universe are such that they allow life to evolve, without assuming that our
universe was a special creation to allow this [1]. In other words, the polyverse
provides a physical basis for an anthropic principle. If we assume, on the other
hand, that the polyverse consists of just one universe, then the only alternative
to the special creation hypothesis is to try to discover a principle that explains
the symmetry groups and values of the coupling constants in our universe.
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